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Rumsfeld, Habermas, and Knowing Our Not-Knowing

THE “UNKNOWN KNOWNS” OF THE PANDEMIC AND OF CLIMATE CHANGE

On June 30, 2021, Donald Rumsfeld, the U.S. defense secretary during the first term of George W. Bush’s presidency and one of the main architects of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, died at the age of eighty-eight. He will be remembered mostly for the catastrophic consequences of the invasion. The goal of the U.S. military intervention was not just to eliminate the threat of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (none were found after the occupation of Iraq), but to change Iraq into a modern secular state and limit Iran’s influence. The result was that Iran became the strongest influence in Iraq, Muslim fundamentalism grew in influence, most of the Christians left the country, women were pushed out of public life, and ISIS emerged.

What were the roots of such a colossal misjudgment? Here, philosophy enters. In March 2003, Rumsfeld engaged in a little bit of amateur philosophizing about the relationship between the known and the unknown. “There are known knowns. These are things we know that we know. There are known unknowns. That is to say, there are things that we know we don’t know. But there are also unknown unknowns. There are things we don’t know we don’t know,” he said. What he forgot to add was the crucial fourth term: the “unknown knowns,” things we don’t know that we know—which is precisely the Freudian unconscious, the “knowledge which doesn’t know itself,” as Lacan used to say. If Rumsfeld thought that the main dangers in the confrontation with Iraq were the “unknown unknowns” (we were not even aware of the threats from Saddam), our reply should have been that the main dangers were, on the contrary, the “unknown knowns,” the disavowed beliefs and suppositions to which we were not even aware of adhering.

This distinction between unknown unknowns and unknown knowns is more pertinent than ever. In the case of ecology, disavowed beliefs and suppositions prevent us from taking the prospect of a catastrophe seriously. And we cannot even understand the common reaction to the ongoing pandemic without the help of Rumsfeld’s epistemology. In April 2020, in reaction to the Covid-19 outbreak, Jürgen Habermas pointed out that “existential uncertainty is now spreading globally and simultaneously, in the minds of media-networked individuals themselves.” He wrote: “There never was so much knowing about our not-knowing and about the constraint to act and live in uncertainty.” And he was right to claim that this not-knowing not only concerns the pandemic itself—we at least have experts there—but even more, its economic, social, and psychic consequences.

Note his precise formulation: It is not simply that we don’t know what goes on, but that we know that we don’t know, and this not-knowing is itself a social fact, inscribed into the ways that our institutions act. We now know that in medieval times or early modernity people knew much less, but they didn’t know this because they relied on a stable ideological foundation which guaranteed that our universe was a meaningful totality. The same holds for some visions of Communism, and even for Fukuyama’s idea of the end of history—they all assumed to know where history was moving.

Habermas was right to locate the uncertainty in “the minds of media-networked individuals.” Our link to the wired universe tremendously expands our knowledge, but at the same time it throws us into radical uncertainty (Have we been hacked? Who controls our access? Is what we read fake news?). The ongoing discoveries about foreign hacking of U.S. government institutions and big companies exemplify this uncertainty. Americans are discovering that they cannot even determine the scope and methods of the hacking taking place. For the U.S., the viral threat is not only a biological one, but also digital.

It is no secret what needs to be done—Greta Thunberg has made it clear. First, we should finally recognize the pandemic crisis for what it is: part of a global crisis of our entire way of life, from ecology to new social tensions. Second, we should establish social control and regulation over the economy. Third, we should rely on science, but without simply accepting it as the agent of decision-making. Why? Let’s return to Habermas: Our predicament is that we are compelled to act while knowing that we don’t know the full coordinates of the situation we are in, and non-acting would itself function as an act.

But is this not the basic situation of every action? Our great advantage is that we know how much we don’t know, and this knowing about our not-knowing opens up space for freedom. We act when we don’t know the whole situation, but this is not simply our limitation. What gives us freedom is that the situation—in our social sphere, at least—is in itself open, not fully (pre)determined.

练习题

According to the passage, which outcome best illustrates the author’s claim that the U.S. invasion of Iraq produced catastrophic unintended consequences?

A. Iraq became a stable modern secular state that limited Iran’s influence.

B. Iran became the strongest influence in Iraq, fundamentalism grew, and ISIS emerged.

C. Weapons of mass destruction were found and removed after the occupation.

D. Iraq’s Christian population expanded and women gained greater public influence.

In Rumsfeld’s original formulation, what are “known unknowns”?

A. Things we know that we know.

B. Things we know we do not know.

C. Things we do not know that we know.

D. Things we do not know we do not know.

Which statement best captures Habermas’s point about pandemic uncertainty as presented in the passage?

A. The pandemic proved that expert knowledge can fully determine political decisions.

B. People today know less than medieval people because media networks reduce access to information.

C. We not only lack knowledge, but also know that we lack knowledge, and this shapes institutional action.

D. Pandemic uncertainty concerns only medical facts about the virus, not social or economic effects.

Which statements correctly describe the author’s use of “unknown knowns”? Select all that apply.

A. They are things we do not know that we know.

B. They correspond to disavowed beliefs and suppositions.

C. They are identified with the Freudian unconscious or “knowledge which doesn’t know itself.”

D. They were, according to the author, more dangerous in Iraq than merely “unknown unknowns.”

E. They are the same as expert scientific uncertainty about pandemic data.

Which claims about modern crisis, uncertainty, and action are supported by the passage? Select all that apply.

A. The pandemic is part of a broader global crisis of the entire way of life.

B. Society should establish social control and regulation over the economy.

C. Science should be relied upon, but not treated as the sole agent of decision-making.

D. Since uncertainty remains, non-action avoids responsibility.

E. Knowing how much we do not know can open a space for freedom.

The passage argues that media networks only expand knowledge and do not intensify uncertainty.

The passage claims that earlier periods such as medieval times had less knowledge, but stable ideological foundations often prevented people from recognizing the extent of their ignorance.

According to the author, the “unknown knowns” are the disavowed beliefs and suppositions that function like the Freudian ___.

For the U.S., the passage says the viral threat is not only biological, but also ___.

How does the author connect acting under uncertainty in the pandemic with the need for political engagement rather than passive waiting, including the prior discussion of Boric?

Which comparison best integrates the section’s discussion of stable ideologies with the prior section’s criticism of returning to a Pinochet-like past?

A. Both passages praise stable ideological foundations because they remove uncertainty from politics.

B. Both passages suggest that returning to an idealized past can conceal present dangers and produce catastrophe.

C. Both passages argue that expert administration alone is enough to solve political crises.

D. Both passages reject any need for action because the social situation is predetermined.

The passage recommends relying on science while also refusing to make science itself the agent of political decision-making.

Which option best connects Habermas’s idea that pandemic uncertainty means “knowing our not-knowing” with the earlier argument about political engagement in Chile?

A. Because uncertainty makes reliable action impossible, citizens should wait until all outcomes are fully known before engaging politically.

B. Because we must act while knowing that we do not know everything, political engagement remains necessary even when available solutions are imperfect.

C. Because expert knowledge eliminates uncertainty, politics should be reduced to technical administration by specialists.

D. Because stable ideologies once gave people certainty, returning to old political models is the safest response to crisis.

Which statements correctly integrate the current section’s discussion of uncertainty and science with the prior section’s discussion of political vision and expert administration?

A. The current section says we should rely on science, but not treat science as the direct agent of decision-making.

B. The prior section says contemporary politics needs a mobilizing political vision, not merely expert administration.

C. Together, the sections suggest that expert knowledge is important but cannot replace political responsibility and collective direction.

D. Together, the sections claim that science should be ignored because politics is only a matter of will.

E. The prior section argues that depoliticized politics is sufficient for confronting pandemic, global warming, and social disorder.

The author’s criticism of Rumsfeld’s Iraq misjudgment and the earlier criticism of returning to a Pinochet-like past both warn that disavowed assumptions or nostalgic models can lead to catastrophe when they ignore the real historical situation.

The current section’s claim that we must act despite uncertainty parallels the prior section’s claim that after Boric’s victory, what is needed is ___: radical change carried out in a way that brings stability and prosperity.

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