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Ukrainian Resistance, Left Ambivalence, and Europe’s Two Chairs

I fully support Ukrainian resistance, and this partisan view makes me attentive to how, unfortunately, many on the Left try to sit on two chairs regarding the Ukrainian war. Most condemn Russian aggression and simultaneously blame the U.S. for it. For example, the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA) reacted to the war by “calling for the dissolution of NATO’s Western alliance and blaming the United States’ ‘imperialist expansionism’ for Russia’s unprovoked attack on Ukraine.”40

The DSA is not ready to admit that in spite of the complexity of the situation, Ukrainians are offering a fully justified and heroic resistance to the Russian attack, a resistance that should be unconditionally supported. Instead of this, one hears “Socialist” voices telling Ukrainian workers that they should organize against Russian occupiers outside the corrupt government and oligarchs’ army. At the end of this road, there is a Leftist conspiracy theory: “The U.S. had its war in Ukraine. Without it, Washington could not attempt to destroy Russia’s economy, orchestrate world condemnation, and lead an insurgency to bleed Russia, all part of an attempt to overthrow its government.”41

In an almost symmetrical way, the liberal Right also doubts that the Left can fully support Ukrainian resistance. Although Putin is definitely not a Leftist, he is, nonetheless, perceived as an ally of some Leftist regimes. No wonder, as in Lacan’s formula of communication, the developed West is getting its own message back from the Third World. Countries from Latin America to South Africa are not ready to unanimously condemn Russia for war crimes in Ukraine—they remember much worse crimes committed by the West around the world. That’s why their reaction to the demand “defend Europe” is: Why should we defend the power which was doing to us what it now condemns in Ukraine? And in some sense, they are right.

Europe is also sitting on two chairs. On March 15, 2022, four European leaders made a long, hazardous journey by train from Poland to Kyiv in a show of support as the city came under further Russian attack. The prime ministers of Poland, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, and Hungary met Zelensky as a curfew was mandated in Kyiv. Afterward, Poland’s prime minister, Mateusz Morawiecki, tweeted that Ukraine was reminding Europe what courage was—it was time for “sluggish and decayed” Europe to reawaken and “break through her wall of indifference and give Ukraine hope,” he wrote.42

Hungary’s prime minister, Viktor Orbán, was not one of the four leaders who met that night; the fourth place was occupied by Jarosław Kaczyński, the head of Poland’s ruling party and the de facto ruler of Poland. We all know the famous dialogue from the 1937 film Silver Blaze about the “curious incident of the dog in the night-time.” Gregory (a Scotland Yard detective) asks: “Is there any other point to which you would wish to draw my attention?” Sherlock Holmes responds: “To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time.” “The dog did nothing in the night-time.” “That was the curious incident.”

It is easy to replace the dog with Orbán: “Is there any other point to which you would wish to draw my attention?” “To the curious incident of Viktor Orbán on the train to Kyiv.” “But Orbán was not on that train.” “That was the curious incident.”

Kaczyński taking the place of the absent Orbán offers the key to the entire affair. It was not just sitting on two chairs; it was one person replacing another on the same chair. Both Orbán and Kaczyński embody, at their purest, the basic stance of some key members of what is commonly referred to as the Visegrád group.

The Visegrád group is composed of post-Communist East European countries that are members of the EU but oppose the EU’s stance on stronger European unity and cooperation, as well as the cultural values of feminism, multiculturalism, anti-racism, and religious neutrality. Poland and Hungary were, until recently, under pressure from Brussels to abandon their anti-abortion and anti-gay politics and inclination toward authoritarianism. The EU even threatened to withhold financial support to these countries if they did not comply with EU rules. Against this pressure, “illiberal democrats” (like Orbán) promoted national identity and Christian tradition. Both Poland and Hungary have used the burden of the Ukrainian war (taking care of the refugees, etc.) to distract the EU from pressuring them to adhere to human rights standards.

练习题

According to the passage, what is the author’s basic position on Ukrainian resistance?

A. The author supports Ukrainian resistance but only if it separates itself from the Ukrainian state.

B. The author fully supports Ukrainian resistance and describes it as justified and heroic.

C. The author argues that Ukrainian resistance is mainly a U.S. proxy project.

D. The author refuses to take a position because both sides are equally responsible.

How does the passage characterize the Democratic Socialists of America’s response to Russia’s attack on Ukraine?

A. They called for stronger NATO intervention and blamed Russia alone.

B. They denied that Russia attacked Ukraine.

C. They condemned Russian aggression while blaming U.S. imperialist expansionism and NATO.

D. They argued that the war was caused only by Ukrainian nationalism.

In the passage’s discussion of the March 15, 2022 train journey to Kyiv, why is Viktor Orbán’s absence treated as important?

A. Because Orbán secretly organized the visit but refused publicity.

B. Because his absence, and Kaczyński’s replacement of him, reveals a deeper Visegrád-style political stance.

C. Because Hungary had already left the European Union before the visit.

D. Because the visit was mainly a protest against Poland’s ruling party.

Which statements accurately reflect the passage’s account of global and ideological reactions to the Ukrainian war? Select all that apply.

A. The liberal Right doubts whether the Left can fully support Ukrainian resistance.

B. The passage describes Putin as a committed Leftist leader.

C. Putin is perceived as an ally of some Leftist regimes, even though he is not a Leftist.

D. Some countries from Latin America to South Africa hesitate to condemn Russia because they remember Western crimes around the world.

E. The passage says the Third World unanimously supports Europe’s demand to “defend Europe.”

Which claims about the Visegrád group, Poland, and Hungary are supported by the passage? Select all that apply.

A. The Visegrád group includes post-Communist East European countries that are members of the EU.

B. The Visegrád stance described in the passage opposes stronger European unity and cooperation.

C. The Visegrád group is presented as the strongest defender of feminism, multiculturalism, anti-racism, and religious neutrality.

D. Poland and Hungary were under pressure from Brussels over anti-abortion and anti-gay politics and authoritarian tendencies.

E. Poland and Hungary used burdens connected with the Ukrainian war, such as refugees, to distract the EU from human-rights pressure.

The passage presents Europe as entirely unified and unambivalent, using the Kyiv train visit only as evidence that all European leaders shared the same stance.

The author argues that Ukrainian resistance to the Russian attack is fully justified and should be unconditionally supported.

The passage says the ___ is composed of post-Communist East European EU members that oppose stronger European unity and values such as feminism, multiculturalism, anti-racism, and religious neutrality.

Explain what the passage means when it says many on the Left try to “sit on two chairs” regarding the Ukrainian war. Include one example from the passage and connect it to the idea of conspiracy-style explanations of the war.

How does the passage use Orbán’s absence from the Kyiv train in a way similar to the idea that an absence can carry meaning?

Which interpretation best integrates the text’s claim that the developed West is “getting its own message back from the Third World” with the earlier Lacanian idea of communication?

A. The Third World’s reluctance to condemn Russia shows that it has accepted Russia’s denial of Ukrainian nationhood.

B. The West’s call to “defend Europe” is returned in inverted form by countries that remember Western crimes and ask why they should defend a power that once harmed them.

C. The West’s message succeeds because Latin America and South Africa unanimously condemn Russia for war crimes.

D. The Third World’s response proves that Ukrainian resistance is not justified.

Which statements correctly connect the current discussion of ambivalence toward the Ukrainian war with prior discussions of paranoid or conspiratorial political narratives?

A. The DSA’s blaming of U.S. imperialism and NATO for Russia’s attack resembles a search for a hidden causal agent behind the visible war.

B. The claim that the U.S. wanted a war in Ukraine to destroy Russia’s economy parallels the earlier use of secret bioweapon labs as a war-related MacGuffin.

C. The text presents the bioweapon-lab accusation as proof that Ukraine’s resistance should not be supported.

D. The earlier discussion of WMDs as a fantasized secret object helps explain how political paranoia can organize blame around a hidden object or plot.

E. The current text says Putin is a Leftist, so left-wing support for Russia is ideologically consistent.

Orbán’s absence from the Kyiv train functions like the earlier examples of blank protest signs or censored names: an absence becomes meaningful because the context makes clear what or who is missing.

Explain how the text’s support for Ukrainian resistance can coexist with its acknowledgment that some countries hesitate to condemn Russia because of Western crimes.

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