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Unknown Knowns and the Pandemic as a Social Process

Unknown Knowns and the Pandemic as a Social Process

We should read Habermas’s claim that we have never had so much knowledge about not-knowing through Rumsfeld’s categories: The pandemic shook what we (thought we) knew that we knew; it made us aware of what we didn’t know that we didn’t know; and, in the way we confronted the pandemic, we relied on what we didn’t know that we know (all our presumptions and prejudices that determine our actions although we are not aware of them). We are not dealing here with the simple passage from not-knowing to knowing, but with the much more subtle passage from not-knowing to knowing what we don’t know—our positive knowing remains the same in this passage, but we gain a free space for action.

It is in regard to what we don’t know that we know—our presumptions and prejudices—that the approach of China (as well as Taiwan and Vietnam) to the pandemic was so much better than Europe and the U.S. I am getting tired of the eternally repeated claim, “Yes, the Chinese contained the virus, but at what price?” While only a whistleblower can tell us the whole story of what really went on there, the fact is that when the virus broke out in Wuhan, the authorities imposed a lockdown and halted the majority of production across the country, clearly prioritizing human lives over the economy. This happened with some delay, true, but they took the crisis extremely seriously. Now they are reaping the rewards, including economically. And let’s be clear, this was only possible because the Communist Party is still able to control and regulate the economy—there is social control over market mechanisms, albeit a “totalitarian” control.

The pandemic is not just a viral process, it is a process that takes place within certain economic, social, and ideological coordinates that are open to change. According to the theory of complex systems, such systems have two opposite features: robust stable character and extreme vulnerability. These systems can accommodate great disturbances, integrating themselves and finding new balance and stability, up to a certain threshold (a “tipping point”), above which a small disturbance can cause a total catastrophe and lead to the establishment of a totally different order. For many centuries, humanity did not have to worry about its impact on the environment—nature was able to adapt itself to deforestation, to the use of coal and oil, etc. However, it seems that today we are approaching a tipping point—one cannot really be sure, since such points can only be clearly perceived once it is already too late. So we encounter a dilemma regarding the urgency to do something about today’s threat of different ecological catastrophes. Either we take the threat seriously and decide to do something which, if the catastrophe does not occur, will appear ridiculous, or we do nothing, and lose everything in the case of the catastrophe. The worst choice would be taking limited measures—in this case, we will fail no matter what occurs. That is to say, the problem is that there is no middle ground in regard to the ecological catastrophe: either it will occur or it will not occur. In such a situation, talk about anticipation, precaution, and risk control tends to become meaningless since we are dealing with “unknown unknowns.” We not only do not know where the tipping point is, we don’t even know exactly what we do not know. The most unsettling aspect of the ecological crisis concerns the so-called “knowledge in the real,” which can run amok. When winter is too warm, plants and animals misread the hot weather as a signal that spring has already begun and start to behave accordingly, thus not only rendering themselves vulnerable to late onslaughts of cold, but also disturbing the entire rhythm of natural reproduction. This is how one should imagine a possible catastrophe: a small-level interruption with devastating global consequences. So, to conclude, we should respectfully follow the old Latin motto Mortuis nihil nisi bonum (“Of the dead, [say] nothing but good”), and we should ignore for a brief moment all the catastrophic decisions of Rumsfeld and remember him as an amateur philosopher who introduced some distinctions useful to analyze our predicament.

练习题

According to the passage, what is the main significance of moving from “not-knowing” to “knowing what we don’t know”?

A. It immediately gives us complete positive knowledge about the situation.
B. It leaves positive knowledge unchanged but opens a free space for action.
C. It proves that expert knowledge is unnecessary in crises.
D. It eliminates the influence of presumptions and prejudices.

Why does the author argue that China’s pandemic response was possible in a way that differed from Europe and the U.S.?

A. Because China had no unknown unknowns about the virus.
B. Because China prioritized market freedom over lockdowns.
C. Because social control over market mechanisms allowed production to be halted in favor of preserving lives.
D. Because China avoided any state intervention in the economy.

Which statement best captures the author’s understanding of the pandemic as a “social process”?

A. The pandemic is only a biological event, so social arrangements are irrelevant.
B. The pandemic unfolds within economic, social, and ideological coordinates that can change.
C. The pandemic proves that ideology disappears during emergencies.
D. The pandemic is best understood as a purely private medical problem.

Which claims about complex systems and ecological crisis are supported by the passage? Select all correct answers.

A. Complex systems can be robust and stable while also extremely vulnerable.
B. A system may absorb large disturbances until a tipping point is crossed.
C. Once a tipping point is crossed, even a small disturbance can produce catastrophe and a different order.
D. Tipping points are always easy to identify well before they are reached.
E. Humanity may now be approaching an ecological tipping point, though certainty is impossible in advance.

According to the passage, which responses to ecological catastrophe are described as problematic or paradoxical? Select all correct answers.

A. Taking the threat seriously may look ridiculous if the catastrophe does not occur.
B. Doing nothing risks losing everything if the catastrophe does occur.
C. Taking only limited measures is described as the worst choice.
D. Risk control is fully reliable because we know exactly where the tipping point is.
E. Unknown unknowns make anticipation and precaution unstable or even meaningless.

The author claims that “unknown knowns” are presumptions and prejudices that shape our actions even though we are not aware of them.

In the author’s view, “knowledge in the real” is reassuring because natural systems always correct their own mistakes before damage spreads.

The passage suggests that ordinary risk management becomes difficult in ecological crisis because we may not know the location of the tipping point or even exactly what we do not know.

In the passage, China’s lockdown and halt of much production are presented as evidence that the authorities prioritized ___ over the economy.

Rumsfeld’s distinctions are useful here because the pandemic revealed not only known knowns and unknown unknowns, but also “unknown ___,” the things we do not know that we know.

Explain why the author thinks limited ecological measures are worse than either serious action or doing nothing.

How does the example of warm winters illustrate the author’s idea that small natural disruptions can have global consequences?

Which claim best connects the current section’s account of the pandemic with the earlier discussion of Rumsfeld’s categories?

A. The pandemic was mainly a shift from ignorance to complete scientific certainty.
B. The pandemic revealed known knowns, unknown unknowns, and unknown knowns, making awareness of not-knowing itself politically significant.
C. The pandemic proved that unknown unknowns are irrelevant once experts begin collecting data.
D. The pandemic showed that social and ideological assumptions do not affect public responses to crises.

Which statements correctly integrate the current section’s discussion of pandemic response and ecological catastrophe with prior arguments about action under uncertainty?

A. Knowing what we do not know can open a space for action rather than simply paralyze us.
B. Because uncertainty exists, non-action is neutral and has no political consequences.
C. The pandemic and ecological crisis both show that crises unfold within social, economic, and ideological conditions, not merely natural processes.
D. Limited measures are presented as the safest middle ground in the face of ecological catastrophe.
E. Acting under uncertainty is unavoidable because waiting for perfect knowledge may itself be a consequential choice.

The current section’s praise of China’s pandemic response supports the prior claim that social control and regulation of the economy may be necessary in crisis situations.

In both the earlier discussion of ecology and the current discussion of pandemic response, hidden presumptions and prejudices are examples of Rumsfeld’s added fourth category: ___.

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